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A Restatement of the Intended Meaning of the 
Establishment Clause in Relation to Education 
and Religion 
John Remington Graham* 
On January 1, 1802, President Thomas Jefferson wrote 
Mssrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. 
Nelson an innocent and gracious letter: 
Gentlemen:-The affectionate sentiments of esteem and appro- 
bation which you are so good to express towards me, on behalf 
of the Danbury Baptist Association, give me the highest satis- 
faction. My duties dictate a faithful and zealous pursuit of the 
interests of my constituents, and in proportion as they are per- 
suaded of my fidelity to those duties, the discharge of them 
becomes more and more pleasing. 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely 
between man and his God, that he owes account to none other 
for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of gov- 
ernment reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate 
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should "make no law re- 
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between 
Church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme 
will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall 
see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments 
which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced 
he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties. 
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and blessing 
of the common Father and Creator of man, and tender you for 
yourselves and your association, assurances of my high respect 
and esteem.' 
* B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1966, University of Minnesota; Member of the Minnesota Bar; 
Lecturer in Law, Hamline University. 
1. THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332-33 (A. Koch & W. 
Peden eds. 1944) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED WRITINGS]. 
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Mr. Jefferson did not intend his decorative metaphor of "a 
wall of separation between Church and State" to be a precise 
formulation of legal principle, as the full text of the letter - a 
social event, not an executive proclamation - plainly shows. 
Given the general and figurative sense of the words as used in 
context, the phrase is little more than a literary flourish of in- 
nocuous significance. Yet some have seized upon this language 
as if it were a venerable landmark carved in legal stone. The 
Danbury Baptist Letter, which is much discussed, but seldom 
read, is supposed to demonstrate that the establishment clause 
prohibits any contact between government and religion.' 
If that abstract principle were taken as universal law in this 
country, and strictly applied without qualification, it would be 
unconstitutional for any organ, branch, magistrate, or employee 
of the government of the United States, or of any state, by any 
official act or use of property, to promote, protect, or acknowl- 
edge any usage, belief, practice, phrase, symbol, institution, con- 
duct, or undertaking having even a remotely religious meaning. 
It would be unconstitutional to permit a magistrate of govern- 
ment to take an oath instead of an drmation when assuming 
the duties of office. The preamble of the Minnesota Constitu- 
tion, which says that the people are grateful to God for the gift 
of freedom, would be legally improper. Our coinage would reflect 
an unconstitutional trust in God. Pope John Paul 11, who was 
welcomed with full state honors in communist Poland, could not 
be permitted to say Mass on the government-owned mall near 
the Washington Monument. Naturally, it would be unconstitu- 
tional to tax church property differently than other private 
property. And, of course, any governmental tax relief or spend- 
ing tending to foster the welfare of religious schools, or to ease 
the burdens of parents sending their children to such institu- 
tions, would be constitutionally prohibited. 
There are only a few ways out of this cul-de-sac. We must 
either grant that all these implications follow from the notion of 
separation of church and state as a constitutional principle and 
see to it that the supposed demands of the first amendment are 
fully enforced, or we must acknowledge that complete separation 
of church and state is politically too demanding, and escape the 
2. The paradigm judicial statement of the separation doctrine is the so-called "Ever- 
son Rule" in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947): "Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Id. at 15 (opinion of Justice Black). 
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more unpopular consequences, case by case, by using some prag- 
matic formula made as palatable as possible by judicial rhetoric. 
We can, however, take another, more fundamental approach: we 
can reexamine the original meaning of the establishment clause 
to determine whether there is something radically unsound 
about the separation doctrine. This article will pursue the last- 
mentioned alternative. 
One particularly difficult problem under the establishment 
clause is caused by various statutes or other governmental acts 
designed to promote religion as a phase of education. In this 
area the cases have applied the idea of separation of church and 
state with varying degrees of rigor. An examination of some of 
the more sweeping separationist decisions of our day provides 
insight into what absolute separationism really means. 
In Tudor v. Board of Education," the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that a public school board resolution permitting free 
distribution of copies of the King James Bible to students on the 
premises of primary and secondary schools, after hours and with 
parental consent, violated state and federal guarantees against 
governmental establishment of religion. The King James Bible is 
one of the greatest works of religious literature ever published. If 
free distribution of a book containing the thrilling story of David 
and Goliath were unconstitutional, the same would hold for an 
anthology including the tale of St. George and the Dragon. Sup- 
pose some organization wished to distribute copies of the Bha- 
gavad Gita in which the General Arjuna and the Lord Khrishna 
discourse on the eternal significance of battle. Or suppose the 
work were Plato's Phaedo in which Socrates eloquently discusses 
life after death before drinking hemlock. If the New Jersey Su- 
preme Court were right, it would appear inescapable that au- 
thorized distribution of any of these works to children on public 
school premises, even after hours and with parental consent, 
would be unconstitutional. This construction would be mani- 
festly correct if the establishment clause required literal separa- 
tion of, hence no contact between, government and religion. 
In Committee v. Nyquist: the United States Supreme 
Court struck down a state law providing for direct grants to 
qualifying primary and secondary nonpublic schools for mainte- 
nance and repair of facilities and equipment, tuition reimburse- 
3. 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954). 
4. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
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ment to parents of children attending such private schools, and 
certain income tax relief to such parents. Against this backdrop, 
in MCLU v. State,' the Minnesota Supreme Court held uncon- 
stitutional, as a law respecting an establishment of religion, an 
intricate statutory scheme of tax credits for parents paying edu- 
cational costs to send their children to nonpublic primary and 
secondary schools. The statute disallowed credits to the extent 
of costs for material used in religious instruction, and was 
designed to make it financially possible for lower-income fami- 
lies to enjoy private education, whether secular or sectarian, 
thereby reducing the cost of public schools borne by taxpayers 
of the state. The opinion of the court was written by Justice 
Todd, who considered certain precedents of the United States 
Supreme Court, particularly Committee v. Nyquist, and con- 
cluded that the measure was invalid. The crucial principle, or 
ratio decidendi, was that if a statute has not a primary ten- 
dency, but any tendency to advance the interests of religious de- 
nominations, it cannot pass constitutional muster. Justice Yetka 
wrote in a concurring opinion, 
I do not fear that the legislation at issue in the instant case 
would somehow foster the establishment of any religion. . . . 
Our legislature appears now to be barred from making any rea- 
sonable effort to insure that nonpublic education will survive 
except for the very wealthy. However, the highest court of our 
land has spoken, and this court must adhere to its word.= 
Perhaps the Minnesota Supreme Court was right in its 
reading of the Nyquist case. If there can be no relationship at  all 
between government and religion, there simply can be no direct 
or indirect public support of private education. Justice Yetka, 
therefore, may have been perfectly accurate in his comments 
concerning such a doctrine. 
Since Committee v. Nyquist there has been further litiga- 
tion, as if to ask the Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court if they really meant what they seemed to say. The answer 
has been an equivocal "maybe, maybe not."7 While a simplistic 
5. 302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975). 
6. 302 Minn. at 236, 224 N.W.2d at 354-55 (Yetka, J., concurring). 
7. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)(New York stat- 
ute appropriating public funds to reimburse nonpublic schools for performing various 
services mandated by the State does not violate establishment clause if its purpose does 
not advance religion); Wolman v. Walter, 433 US. 229 (1977)(statute authorizing various 
forms of aid to nonpublic schools, most of which are sectarian, is not unconstitutional); 
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doctrine of church-state separation has the virtue of predictabil- 
ity, its great vice is an eventual government monopolization of 
education. 
A central premise of the judicial trend being discussed is 
that tax support of public education is religiously neutral. A few 
years ago, Dr. Onalee McGraw published an incisive challenge to 
this assumptiod.' She claims that evidence indicating a fall of 
academic standards in public schools can be explained by the 
infusion of humanistic values into the curricula of instruction. 
She argues that children in public schools are systematically 
taught situation ethics, ethical relativism, and the like; and that 
these systems actually displace or compete with traditional, nat- 
ural-law values of Judeo-Christianity. She contends further that 
this process of indoctrination has been so over-emphasized in 
some places as to exclude adequate focus on reading, writing, 
factual knowledge, logical reasoning, and mathematics. 
This proposition should no doubt be considered with caw 
tion. And in the view of this writer, it misses the mark to con- 
demn the religious philosophy of Humanism, which rests on a 
tradition as old as Epicurus, and to extol the precepts of Judeo- 
Christianity. But it is relevant to note that a distinctive moral 
system is taught with the help of public funds in some public 
schools. In a proper legal sense, Humanisms is a religion,1° and 
a venerable one at that. Educators are not to be condemned for 
attempting to teach children how to think in moral terms. No 
education would be sac ient ,  or even possible, without instruc- 
tion concerning what ought to be, as well as what is. 
This consideration provides us with a key. The first amend- 
Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)(statute providing public aid to quRlifvinP col- 
leges and universities does not violate first amendment's establishment clause); Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)(loans of instructional materials and equipment to non- 
public schools violates establishment clause). In an attempt to reconcile the notions of 
"separation of church and state" and "religious neutrality," the Court used a three- 
pronged test, which had its apparent genesis in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US. 602 (1971). 
According to this contemporary doctrine, to pass constitutional muster a statute must 
have an essentially secular purpose, must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and must 
not excessively entangle government with religion. Id. a t  612-13. 
8. 0. MCGRAW, SECULAR HUMANISM IN THE SCHOOLS: Tim ISSUE WHOSE TIME HAS 
COME (1976). 
9. See THE HUMANIST MANIFESTOS I AND I1 (Prometheus Books 1976). 
10. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Washington Ethical 
Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
338 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
ment ordains that there shall be "no law respecting an establish- 
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The 
word "religion" appears only once. Manifestly, the establishment 
clause and the free exercise clause deal with the same subject 
matter. On the face of the Constitution, whatever amounts to 
"religion" for purposes of free exercise is also "religion" for pur- 
poses of no establishment.ll 
Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service 
Act of 1951, and the Military Selective Service Acts of 1967 and 
19711a provided exemption from conscription to persons who are 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by 
reason of religious training and belief. This provision has been 
interpreted to include persons who are opposed to all war, 
whether they believe in God or not, even if they belong to no 
religious sect, and who express their deeply held beliefs solely in 
worldly terms? While these cases ostensibly turn on statutory 
construction rather than constitutional principle, an idea of "re- 
ligion" defined in the broadest possible way emerges. This legal 
conception of religion is measured by depth of belief concerning 
right and wrong, and is at least influenced by the religion clauses 
of the first amendment. 
Given a definition this broad, "religion" must permeate vir- 
tually all phases of human life including education. Thus de- 
fined, religion cannot be extracted or separated from any system 
of education, public or private. Why, therefore, should anyone 
be surprised to learn that Humanism should be taught or that 
some other religious influence, such as Hinduism or Judeo- 
Christianity, should be felt in public schools? Even if a teacher 
avoids the use of theological language or symbols in the class- 
room, he will, should, and must teach something about the foun- 
11. Cf. Rutledge, J., dissenting in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 at 32. The 
United States Supreme Court has nevertheless adopted the contra-textual position that 
"religion" is broader for purposes of free exercise than for purposes of establishment. 
SpecXcally, under present case law, "religion" in the free exercise clause means any 
deeply held belief system which determines right and wrong for an individual, whether 
theistic, nontheistic, agnostic, atheistic, or antitheistic. In the establishment clause, "re- 
ligion" means a formal organization or institution which teaches or promotes a religious 
doctrine, program, ritual, or ideology as an integral part of its mission. For a helpN 
analysis of how the United States Supreme Court arrived at this curious position, see L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN C O N S ~ O N A L  LAW 826-33 (1978). 
12. 50 U.S.C. app. g 4566) (1968). 
13. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
163 (1965). In the Welsh case, Justice Harlan proposed that the establishment clause, no 
less than the free exercise clause, required this result. 398 U.S. at 360 n.12. 
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dations of right and wrong - and this amounts to "religion" in 
the legal sense under consideration here. If we take religion as 
the foundation of conscience, so as to encompass the whole 
human family, all education is religious, even in public schools. 
And why should this not be so? Religion does not cease to be 
taught simply because the institution is a so-called "nonsec- 
tarian" or "public" school. Religion and education are perma- 
nently married, regardless of the name of the institution, the 
source of revenues, or the method of instruction.14 
Clearly, then, there is some rudimentary deficiency in cur- 
rent judicial trends concerning the application of the establish- 
ment clause to statutes which provide for various kinds of public 
support of private schools. In order to untangle the difficulty, we 
must go to the roots of the problem. With that end in view this 
article will attempt, principally by analysis of legal history, to 
propound a number of propositions: 
(1) The establishment clause is a corollary of, and histori- 
cally developed from, the free exercise clause, which, in turn, 
evolved as a step beyond the Toleration Acts. (2) Both the free 
exercise clause and the establishment clause were premised on 
and presuppose the existence of God. (3) The notion of religion 
is exactly the same for purposes of both the establishment clause 
and the free exercise clause, viz., recognition of the ultimate 
foundation of conscience and morality. (4) The free exercise 
clause guarantees governmental noninterference with peaceable 
religious freedom. (5) The establishment clause, aside from do- 
ing away with an official state religion supported by public mon- 
ies, guarantees government neutrality toward or equal protection 
of all religions peaceably practiced. (6) In the constitutional 
sense, all persons have a religion, whether or not they believe in 
a personal deity or spiritual reality. (7) In the constitutional 
sense, religion inescapably permeates every phase of human life 
in which questions of right and wrong must be decided. (8) 
Whether public or private, sectarian or secular, all education is 
necessarily religious in the eyes of the law. (9) Support of educa- 
tion, including the religious phases thereof, is a proper function 
of government, so long as religious neutrality is observed. (10) 
Governmental assistance to private education, even if sectarian, 
14. Cf. Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in the 
Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177 (explores questions relating to whether the con- 
cept of religious neutrality required in the public schools is real or illusory and suggests 
an alternative to the present religious neutrality doctrine). 
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is not only constitutionally permissible, but constitutionally ob- 
ligatory, to the extent that such aid is requisite to achieve gov- 
ernmental neutrality in matters of religion. 
A. Principles of Constitutional Interpretation 
Initally, it will be well to consider a time-honored rule of 
constitutional interpretation which was stated by Justice Story 
as follows: 
The safest rule of interpretation, after all, will be to look to the 
nature and objects of the particular powers, duties, and rights, 
with all the lights and aids of contemporary history, and to 
give the words of each just such operation and force, consistent 
with their legitimate meaning, as may fairly secure the ends 
proposed.15 
We should heed the words of Justice Gray that the "scope 
and effect of .  . . many . . . provisions of the Constitution are 
best ascertained by bearing in mind what the law was before."16 
Thus Justice Black reminds us, "It is never to be forgotten that, 
in the construction of the language of the Constitution . . . we 
are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of 
the men who framed that instrument."17 Moreover, it has tradi- 
tionally been held that the Constitution must be interpreted ac- 
cording to what was intended and cannot be changed save by 
amendment.le To be sure, there are other theories of constitu- 
tional interpretation suggesting that the courts should be free to 
change the fundamental law by interpretation reflecting their 
own views of public policy; but, this writer substantially agrees 
with the position of Professor Raoul Bergerl@ and other contem- 
porary scholars that the proper aim of constitutional interpreta- 
tion should be ascertainment of the intended meaning, no more 
or less. It is beyond the scope of this article to do more than 
examine the intended meaning of the religion clauses of the first 
15. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 610-11 (1842). 
16. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 (1885). 
17. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72 (1947)(Black, J., dissenting)(quoting Ex 
parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887)). 
18. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,154, 288 (1970)(Harlan, J., and Stew- 
art, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 DaU 
304, 308 (Pa. 1795). 
19. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: 'hm TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR- 
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). 
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amendment, particularly the guarantee against the establish- 
ment of religion as applied to the problem of public support of 
private education, and to seek out along those lines a more equi- 
table solution than currently exists under contemporary case 
law. 
B. The Law of the Mother Country 
In the aftermath of the struggle between Pope Clement VII 
and King Henry VIII, the Crown became the head of the Church 
of England. As such the King could convene, prorogue, restrain, 
regulate, or dissolve all ecclesiastical synods or convocations, 
nominate and license elections of bishops, veto episcopal elec- 
tions contrary to his nominations, and vest his bishops with 
temporal powers and estates; moreover, he could decide in 
dernier resort all appeals in ecclesiastical causes, both temporal 
and spiritual." Parsons of the established church were entitled 
to the enjoyment of public lands, or glebes, and compulsory 
taxes, or tithes, under episcopal, and ultimately royal 
jurisdiction." 
The common law condemned the crimes of apostacy (renun- 
ciation of previously professed Christianity)? heresy (denial of 
essential doctrines of the chur~h),'~ blasphemy (contemptuous 
reproaches of sacred personages)? as well as witchcraft, conju- 
ration, sorcery, enchantment, and the like? Anciently, the pun- 
ishments for these offenses were severe: in Query XVII of Notes 
on Virginia, Thomas Jefferson observed that the common-law 
crime of heresy was punishable by burning at the stake pursuant 
to the writ of haeretico ~ornburendo.~~ 
In due course these old common-law crimes were displaced 
by more moderate acts of Parliament.n By the Statute of 9 & 10 
William 111, Chapter 32 (1699), it was provided that if any pro- 
fessed Christian denied the truth of the religion, the divine au- 
thority of the Bible, the divinity of the persons of the Holy Trim- 
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 279-80, 377-80. 
Id. at 383-87; 2 id. at 24-33. 
4 id. at 42-44. 
Id. at 44-45. 
Id. at 59. 
Id. at 60-65. 
S E L E ~ D  WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 274; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 
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ity, or either the singularity or the existence of God, he could 
lose capacity to hold any public office or trust on conviction for 
the first offense. And, on conviction for the second offense, one 
could lose capacity to be a suitor in court, a guardian, executor, 
legatee, or purchaser of lands, and could also suffer imprison- 
ment for three years. By the Statutes of 1 Edward VI, Chapter 1 
(1547), and 1 Elizabeth I, Chapter 1 (1558), reviling the Sacra- 
ment of the Lord's Supper was made punishable by imprison- 
ment; while the Statute of 1 Elizabeth I, Chapter 2 (1558), pro- 
vided that a minister speaking in derogation of the Book of 
Common Prayer was subject to the loss of benefice and impris- 
onment. Moreover, those who refused to attend services of the 
established church or other approved denominations were made 
liable to suffer money  forfeiture^.^^ 
Protestant dissenters from the Church of England were at 
one time subject to a number of disabilities and  restriction^.^^ 
But by the Act of Tolerationso in 1689, such dissenters were re- 
lieved of these disabilities and restrictions if they did not deny 
the Holy Trinity, took oaths or armations against popery, 
registered their congregations with the established church, and 
kept open meeting houses, and if their teachers acknowledged 
one true Christian faith as well as the doctrine of sacraments. 
Catholics, by contrast, were simply not tolerated. They were 
subject to heavy penalties and disabilities for hearing Mass, 
teaching school, keeping arms, and even for traveling to London. 
Their priests were deported and could be made liable for high 
treason should they stay in the kingdom for three days without 
conformity to the established church.s1 
The established church was also protected by the Corpora- 
tion Act,s2 which act ordained that no person could hold public 
office, unless within the previous year he received the Sacrament 
of the Lord's Supper according to the rites of the Church of 
England and took an oath of allegiance to the Crown. The Test 
28. See Act for the Uniformity of Common Prayer and Senrice in the Church, and 
Administration of the Sacraments, 1558, 1 Eliz. 1, c. 2, g 4; Act to Retain the Queen's 
Majesty's Subjects in Their Due Obedience, 1581, 23 Eliz. 1, c. 1, 5 5; Act for the Better 
Discovering and Repressing of Popish Recusants, 1606, 3 Jac., c. 4, Q 27. 
29. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 53-54. 
30. Act of Toleration, 1689, 1 W. & M. 1, c. 18. 
31. Id. at 54-59. 
32. Act for the Well-Governing and Regulation of Corporations, 1661, 13 Car. 2, c. 1, 
g 12. 
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Act," provided that no person could hold civil or military office 
unless he took an oath of allegiance to the Crown and made a 
formal declaration against transubstantiation. 
C. The Law of Colonial Virginia 
Virginia was settled primarily by adherents of the Church of 
England. It is therefore not surprising to see colonial statutes 
similar to those of the mother country. During the embryonic 
days of the colony, a statute was enacted for compulsory taxa- 
tion to support the established church." Other early statutes 
barred Catholics from holding office:6 and Quakers from the col- 
o n ~ . ~  At this same period of colonial infancy, there were stat- 
utes enacted to regulate the ministry and proprietary operations 
of the established church," and even the manner by which sub- 
jects were to keep the sabbath.s8 All of these laws were amplified 
and continued up to the outbreak of the American Revolution. 
There was also a general reenactment of the Statute of 9 & 
10 William 111, which punished certain forms of heresy and 
apostacy, together with adoption of the Toleration Act of 1 
William & Mary, which gave limited relief to Protestant 
 dissenter^.^" 
From the foregoing survey, we may deduce several charac- 
teristic features of the laws of England and colonial Virginia 
respecting matters of religion: 
(1) The King, who was chief executive magistrate of the 
civil state, was also temporal head of an established church. (2) 
The established church held public lands, and was supported by 
taxes paid by all persons without regard to religious belief. (3) 
The established church was regulated by public law. (4) Failure 
to conform to the doctrines and practices of the established 
church, however peaceable, could result in criminal penalties, 
civil disabilities, and monetary or proprietary forfeitures, unless 
excused by acts of toleration. 
33. Act for Preventing Dangers Which May Happen From Popish Recusants, 1672, 
25 Car. 2, c. 2, §§ 2-10. Compare the Test Act with U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3: "[N]o 
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any O5ce or public trust under 
the United States." Id. 
34. 1 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 144, Act 9 (W. Hening comp. 1823). 
35. Id. at 268-69, Act 51. 
36. Id. at 532-33, Act 6. 
37. Id. at 241, Act 1. 
38. Id. at 434, Act 3. 
39. 3 id. at 358-59, ch. 30. 
344 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
D. The 16th Article of the Virginia Bill of Rights 
These were conditions which the Virginia Convention of 
1776 sought to abolish at the dawn of independence. This ex- 
traordinary assemblage, born in the throes of revolution, was the 
concrete, legal form of the new sovereign, which had displaced 
King George I11 who had violated the fundamental law, made 
war on his American subjects, constructively fled from the realm 
when his royal governor left by sea, and therefore abdicated by 
operation of the same principle of the English Constitution that 
wrought the ouster of King James I1 in 1688.40 On June 29,1776, 
Virginia formally seceded from the British Empire." 
A few weeks before this act of secession, the convention 
framed the famous Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, which set 
forth essential conceptions of a republican form of government. 
Only the 16th Article need concern us here. As originally pro- 
posed, the provision read: 
That religion, or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the man- 
ner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and con- 
viction, and not by force or violence; and, therefore, that all 
men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of relig- 
ion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and 
unrestrained by the magistrate, unless, under color of religion, 
any man disturb the peace, the happiness, or the safety of soci- 
ety; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian 
forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.'% 
On motion of James Madison, the proposal was amended, 
then adopted on June 12, 1776, so as to read: 
That religion, or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the man- 
ner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and con- 
viction, not by force or violence; and therefore, all men are en- 
titled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates 
of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice 
Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other? 
The original draft of what became the 16th Article guaran- 
teed the "fullest toleration in the exercise of religion." The final 
version guaranteed the "free exercise of religion." This little 
40. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 152, 245. 
41. 1 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 50-51 (W. Hening comp. 1823). 
42. C. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN 
Vmmw 62 (1900). 
43. Id. at 62. 
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twist of phrase might first go unnoticed, but it was of enormous 
significance: it denoted a transition from the toleration of re- 
ligious dissent in the presence of an established church associ- 
ated with the sovereign power of the civil commonwealth, to 
equal and peaceable exercise of religious freedom, entirely disas- 
sociated with any established church. The seminal idea was that 
"free exercise," which was a step beyond "toleration," included 
an implicit abolition of the "establishment." And this seminal 
idea was amplified by the Virginia General Assembly in the 
ensuing years. 
At the time of independence, there was still an established 
church in Virginia which enjoyed glebes and tithes. And the old 
colonial laws punishing various acts of religious dissent were still 
on the books. 
The first General Assembly under the Virginia Constitution 
of 1776 immediately repealed all laws penalizing heresy, apos- 
tacy, and nonconformity; exempted all dissenters from payment 
of tithes and taxes in support of the established church; and sus- 
pended the operation of the most recent colonial statute provid- 
ing for compulsory taxation to support the established church.44 
The suspension of such tax liability was continued further, then 
abolished in 1779.45 
Still, the established Church of England in Virginia held ti- 
tle to public property, and was the official or established church 
of the Commonwealth. There was naturally a question of 
whether even this greatly reduced condition was lawful under 
the 16th Article of the Virginia Bill of Rights. Moreover, there 
was the question regarding the validity of the general assess- 
ment, a proposed scheme whereby every citizen should be com- 
pelled to pay a tax in support of some religious denomination of 
his own choosing. The great repealer of the first General Assem- 
blf6 expressly provided, "That nothing in this act contained 
shall be construed to affect or influence the said question of 
assessment." These matters were subsequently dealt with by the 
Virginia General Assembly in the controversies over general 
assessment, church incorporation, and glebes liquidation. 
44. 9 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 164-65 (W. Hening comp. 1823). 
45. 10 id. at 111, 197. 
46. 9 id. at 164-65. 
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E. The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom 
In 1779 a bill was introduced in the Virginia General As- 
sembly which provided substantially that Christianity, in one 
form or another, was the established religion of the Common- 
wealth; that all denominations of Christianity were entitled to 
the same peaceable rights of worship and practice; that all de- 
nominations of Christianity were entitled to incorporation and 
official recognition, so long as they subscribed to certain funda- 
mental tenets, such as the existence of God and the divine 
authority of the Bible; and that every freeholder should pay 
compulsory taxes to support the clergy and places of worship of 
the Christian denomination of his choice.'? This bill, after some 
debate, died without action one way or another. 
But a similar bill, only slightly watered down, was intro- 
duced in the Virginia General Assembly on December 2, 1 7 8 P  
The preamble of the bill read as follows: 
Whereas the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a 
natural tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their 
vices, and preserve the peace of society, which cannot be ef- 
fected without a competent provision for learned teachers, who 
may be thereby enabled to devote their time and attention to 
the duty of instructing such citizens as from their circum- 
stances and want of education cannot otherwise attain such 
knowledge; and it is judged such provision may be made by the 
Legislature, without counteracting the liberal principle hereto- 
fore adopted and intended to be preserved, by abolishing all 
distinctions of pre-eminence amongst different societies or 
communities of Christians. . . .'O 
The initial debate was very heated and resulted in a layover 
of the bill to the 1785 session, largely for the purpose of securing 
the sentiments of the people of the Commonwealth. A great 
many petitions and memorials were presented on the subject, 
the most notable of which was the Remonstrance composed by 
James M a d i s ~ n . ~ ~  Madison's Remonstrance eloquently con- 
demned the proposed general assessment as contrary to the 
guarantee of free exercise of religion in the 16th Article of the 
Virginia Bill of Rights, as against the spirit of the American 
47. H. ECKENRODE, S PARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA 58-61 (1910). 
48. Id. at 99. 
49. C. J m s ,  supra note 42, at 129. 
50. Id. at 256-62 (appendix G). 
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Revolution, as unnecessary to the support of the civil govern- 
ment, as tending to frustrate the emergence of religious truth, 
and as contrary to the interests of public policy and domestic 
peace. 
One noteworthy passage in the Remonstrance said, 
The religion then of every man must be left to the conviction 
and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man 
to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature, 
an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of 
men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their 
minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men. It is unalien- 
able, also, because what is a right towards man is a duty to- 
wards the Creator. It is a duty of every man to render to the 
Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes is accept- 
able to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time and 
in degree of obligation to the claims of civil s~ciety.~' 
It is apparent that Madison saw religion as a duty to God 
commanded by conscience, more fundamental than the duty to 
government commanded by law. In other words, Madison per- 
ceived religion as the paramount duty of conscience. It will be 
recalled that in 1776 the General Assembly of Virginia abolished 
all laws which punished the profession of atheism.62 Yet it is in- 
disputable that this enactment was constitutionally required by, 
and intentionally passed in, obedience to the 16th Article of the 
Virginia Bill of Rights, which was premised on the existence of 
God. Here we have a curious legal paradox: by law God exists, 
yet by the same law a citizen may deny the existence of God. In 
order to resolve this difficulty, it is necessary to say that God has 
a legal existence for all persons, whatever their philosophical or 
theological beliefs may be. 
It is undeniable that all persons have some primary obli- 
gation of conscience drawn by some moral idea or impulse. 
Whatever the moral imperative or standard may be in specific 
terms for any individual, such must be his God for legal pur- 
poses. In other words, God may be legally defined as, and must 
have been considered by Madison to be, the foundation of 
conscience. 
The 16th Article of the Virginia Bill of Rights said that re- 
ligion is duty to God according to conscience. If we translate this 
51. Id. at 256. 
52. 9 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 164-65 (W. Hening comp. 1823). 
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into the legal framework just proposed, religion will be seen as 
following the ultimate dictates of conscience; or, to say the same 
thing in another way, the fundamental decisions of con- 
science-those which pertain to the most important questions in 
life-are religious acts in the eyes of the law. The right to make 
and execute such determinations, free from governmental inter- 
ference, was protected by the 16th Article of the Virginia Bill of 
Rights, subject only to the limitation that no such religious or 
conscientious act be harmful to others. 
When the Virginia General Assembly met in late 1785, not 
only was the bill for general assessment defeated, but a bill pre- 
viously authored by Thomas Jefferson was introduced, and then 
passed on January 19, 1786.- This was the famous Virginia 
Statute of Religious Freedom. The enactment began with an in- 
vocation: "Almighty God hath made the mind free." This was in 
perfect conformity with the invocation of the "Laws of Nature 
and Nature's God" in the Declaration of Independence as 
drafted by Jefferson and adopted, without alteration in this re- 
spect, by the Second Continental Congre~s.~ Far from ordaining 
a separation of church and state, the Virginia Statute of Reli- 
gious Freedom proclaimed a cooperative friendship between the 
two: the existence of God who made the mind free was the statu- 
tory reason for governmental recognition of religious freedom. 
Furthermore, this governmental friendship with religion was 
not to be confined to Christianity, but was to extend to all reli- 
gions equally. Hence Jefferson said in his autobiography: 
Where the preamble declares that coercion is a departure from 
the plan of the holy author of our religion, an amendment was 
proposed, by inserting the word "Jesus Christ," so that it 
should read, "a departure from the plan of Jesus Christ, the 
holy author of our religion"; the insertion was rejected by a 
great majority, in proof that they meant to comprehend, within 
the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the 
Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and Infidel of every 
denominati~n.~~ 
Surely Jefferson would likewise have endorsed the very ex- 
pansive definition of religion recognized relative to the military 
53. 12 id. at 84, ch. 34; SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 311-13. 
54. SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 22. 
55. Id. at 47. 
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draft in cases such as United States u. Seege? and Welsh u. 
United  state^.^' There was a well-implemented system of com- 
pulsory military service in Jefferson's day, and it appears that 
conscientious objection to such duty was actually considered as a 
right included in the free exercise of religion? Hence, the then- 
existing constitutions of New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, 
and Pennsylvania all made reference to those who were "consci- 
entiously scrupulous of bearing arms;"6@ whereas the constitu- 
tional ratification conventions of Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Rhode Island, in dealing with the same problem, mentioned 
those who were "religiously scrupulous of bearing arms.'m0 This 
is another way in which the virtual identity of religion and con- 
science was made manifest for legal purposes. If in law religion 
is conscience, then in law everyone has a religion. If in law God 
is the foundation of conscience, then in law everyone has a God. 
These very broad and interacting ideas of God, religion, and 
conscience were part of American legal usage when Madison and 
Jefferson forged the principles which became the free exercise 
and establishment clauses of the first amendment. 
The preamble of the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom 
reasoned that, since God is the author of religious truth and 
human freedom, religious truth will best become known if left 
uninterrupted by governmental coercion and favoritism. The 
main body of the statute was short and to the point: 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That no man shall be 
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place 
or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, mo- 
lested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise 
suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all 
men shall be free to profess and by argument to maintain, their 
opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no 
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capa~ities.~' 
The statute simply said that a man cannot be taxed to sup- 
port an official religion or an established church, and shall not 
56. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
57. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
58. See, e.g., J. GRAHAM, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE MILITARY DRAFT 71-81 
(1971). 
59. 4 AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAWS 2455 (F. Thorpe ed. 
1907); 5 id. at 2637, 3083; 6 id. at 3740-3741. 
60. 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE F ~ E R A L  CONSTITUTION 335 (1869); Id. Vol. 3 at 659; 
Id. Vol. 4 at 244. 
61. 12 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 86 (W. Hening comp. 1823). 
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be subject to any civil disability or criminal punishment on ac- 
count of his peaceable and free exercise of religion. It did not lay 
down a sweeping and absolute rule that government and religion 
may never, under any circumstances, come into contact. It did 
not say that government may not encourage all religions on 
equal terms. 
The concluding section or paragraph of the statute said that 
religious freedom is a natural right. This necessarily means that 
it is a right of all human beings, including those who do not be- 
lieve in personal deity or spiritual reality. The universality of 
religion contemplated by the statute serves to equate religion 
and conscience for legal purposes. 
Finally, it should not be overlooked that the establishment 
clause of the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom was simply a 
further exposition and clarification of the free exercise clause of 
the Virginia Bill of Rights. What one clause said about God, re- 
ligion, and conscience was carried over into the other without 
alteration. 
F. The Incorporation Act and Liquidation of the Glebes 
On January 5, 1785, the Virginia General Assembly passed 
an "Act for Incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Chur~h,''~' 
which detailed the manner of deciding church questions, ap- 
pointing officers and vesteries, selecting and removing ministers 
and holding church property, etc. The statute specifically re- 
served to the reorganized church the glebes or lands acquired for 
the old establishment at public expense prior to the revolution. 
Just after the enactment of the Virginia Statute of Religious 
Freedom, the evangelical denominations petitioned against the 
Incorporation Act because the Act maintained a degree of state 
control over church government and did not disturb church 
ownership of state-acquired property. On January 8, 1787, after 
a spirited controversy, the Virginia General Assembly passed a 
repealer6' which abolished all state regulation of churches but 
left ownership of the glebes in the hands of the Episcopal 
Church. 
The final stage of political controversy centered around the 
old glebes. The evangelical denominations argued that, "The 
colony had unjustly taxed dissenters to furnish glebes and 
62. Id. Vol. 11 at 532, ch. 49. 
63. Id. Vol. 12 at 266, ch. 12. 
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churches for the establishment; the remedy was confiscation of 
the ecclesiastical property for the benefit of all citizens 
equally."64 By way of defense, the Episcopal Church contended 
that "the contest for the glebes, churches, and chapels is not of a 
religious nature, but is to be decided by the rules of private 
p r~per ty . "~~  After years of struggle, the Virginia General Assem- 
bly succumbed to evangelical pressure, and, on January 20,1802, 
passed a Confiscatory Act6" providing for the liquidation of the 
glebes as they became vacant by reason of the deaths of incum- 
bent parsons, and stipulating that liquidation proceeds were to 
be used for the benefit of the poor and other public purposes. 
The validity of the measure was raised by suit in equity 
brought by the vestrymen and church wardens of a vacant par- 
ish to enjoin sale of the glebe?' They contended that the church 
corporation could not be deprived of vested property rights ret- 
roactively and without just compensation, a perfectly sound pro- 
position having nothing to do with religion as such. The Chan- 
cellor dismissed the bill, and an appeal was taken. The four 
judges of the Virginia Supreme Coirt were divided equally, so 
the decree of dismissal stood. Judges Tucker and Roane held es- 
sentially that the title of the established church was good before 
the revolution, having been vested by public donation; that the 
established church was dissolved by operation of the revolution; 
that, by reason thereof, title reverted back to the successor of 
the donor, which could only be the Commonwealth of Virginia; 
and that, therefore, the complainants had no title on which to 
sue for relief. Judges Carrington and Lyons answered that the 
revolution neither dissolved the established church, nor divested 
title to its lands then held, inasmuch as the governmental altera- 
tion of that time did not affect private property previously 
vested, and could only have prospectively changed the legal rela- 
tion between the government and the church. Since the com- 
plainants were representatives of the legitimate successor to the 
old corporation, Judges Carrington and Lyons insisted that re- 
lief should have been granted. 
A similar case reached the United States Supreme Court? 
in which Justice Story held that the vestry of a vacant parish 
64. H. EKENRODE, supra note 47, at 130. 
65. Id. at 136, 142. 
66. Id. at 147. 
67. Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804). 
68. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). 
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was the legitimate successor to the pre-revolutionary corpora- 
tion. The church, the Court held, was not dissolved by the 
Revolution and continued to hold title to the parish glebe. 
Therefore, it was adjudged that the vestry was entitled to equi- 
table intervention. That would seem to indicate final judicial 
condemnation of the Confiscatory Act. 
Notwithstanding the downfall of the Confiscatory Act for 
technical reasons, there can be no doubt of the constitutional 
principle, applicable at least prospectively, that no church or re- 
ligious body may hold state-donated property acquired by state 
tax revenue. This is a perfectly natural inference from the 
Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom. 
G.  Derivation of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment 
Before attempting a summary of the foregoing, it would be 
' 
well to consider how and why the free exercise and establish- 
ment clauses of the first amendment to the United States Con- 
stitution derive from, and therefore recapitulate respectively, 
the 16th Article of the Virginia Bill of Rights and Virginia Stat- 
ute of Religious Freedom. In adopting the Federal Constitution, 
the Virginia Convention of 1788 annexed to its Ordinance of 
Ratification a long declaration of rights or proposed amend- 
ments to the new charter of the Union. 
The 20th of these declarations reads as follows: 
That religion, or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the 
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and 
conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men have 
an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience, and that no 
particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or estab- 
lished, by law, in preference to others."' 
It is obvious that the language just quoted was paraphrased 
from the 16th Article of the Virginia Bill of Rights, save for the 
last clause which was a brief recapitulation of the Virginia Stat- 
ute of Religious Freedom. James Madison, who had been a 
prominent member of the Virginia Convention of 1788, and one 
of the authors of the 20th declaration under consideration 
69. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 60, at 659. 
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here,1° was elected to the United States House of Representa- 
tives in the First Congress. There he ably executed his promise 
to secure a Federal Bill of Rights in order to secure the accept- 
ance of the new C~nstitution.~~ Among his proposals in Congress 
on June 8, 1789, was an article which read: 
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of reli- 
gious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be estab- 
lished, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in 
any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.72 
After further deliberations,ls the House proposed an amendment 
which said, "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall the rights of con- 
science be infringed.''74 
Following a joint conference between the House and Senate, 
Congress proposed, on September 25, 1789, the full Federal Bill 
of Rights as we now have it, including the language, "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."76 Congress was full of re- 
joicing. Lest there be any doubt of an intent not to ordain a 
complete separation of government and religion, let it be well 
noted that the House and Senate passed the following resolution 
on September 26, 1789: 
Resolved, That a joint committee of both Houses be appointed 
to wait on the President of the United States, to request that 
he should recommend to the people of the United States a day 
of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed, by acknowl- 
edging with grateful hearts, the many signal favors of Almighty 
God, especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to 
70. Id. at 656. 
71. See B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 86-217 (1955). This re- 
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establish a constitution of government for their safety and 
happines~.~~ 
What then did Thomas Jefferson mean by the words "a wall 
of separation between Church and State" in the Danbury Bap- 
tist Letter? His reference was to the establishment clause in the 
first amendment and the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom. 
In other words, he was not writing about a general prohibition of 
contact or interaction between government and religion at all. 
The so-called "wall of separation" simply meant that there shall 
be no official religion of state supported by public revenues, that 
there shall be no penalties for the peaceable and free exercise of 
religion, and that all religions shall enjoy equal protection and 
friendship of the government. 
There is another point about the Danbury Baptist Letter 
which is often overlooked. Jefferson plainly stated that the re- 
ligion clauses of the first amendment were designed to protect 
the "rights of conscience." He certainly had in mind a sweeping 
idea of religion, an idea large enough to encompass the funda- 
mental or primary demands of conscience for all men. Religion 
in this sense is so pervasive that it simply cannot be literally 
separated, or severed of all contact, from the operations of gov- 
ernment. Jefferson's "wall of separation," therefore, should not 
be taken as a rigid rule that the government must never touch 
the religious affairs of men. 
IV. GENERAL SUMMARY AND SPECIFIC FOCUS ON EDUCATION 
From this survey, we may take a panoramic view of the in- 
tended meaning of the religion clauses of the first amendment: 
(I) The civil government may not be associated with an offi- 
cial, preferred, or established church or religion; (2) Neverthe- 
less, government and all forms of religion equally stand in per- 
petual friendship; (3) No church, ministry, or place of worship 
run by a particular denomination may be supported by tax reve- 
nues, or hold property purchased with tax revenues; (4) No legal 
disabilities, forfeitures, or penalties of any kind may be conse- 
quent on the peaceable exercise of religion; (5) God has a legal 
existence, which may be officially acknowledged, and a legal defi- 
nition, viz., the foundation of conscience; (6) For legal purposes, 
religion is recognition, in word or deed, of God or the ultimate 
76. Id. at 216. 
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basis of morality; And (7) the civil government may not regulate 
the peaceable exercise of religion, including the conduct of the 
religious affairs of any church, ministry, place of worship, or 
individual. 
When the free exercise and establishment clauses are put 
into proper perspective, it is easier to understand why active 
governmental support of private and sectarian education is not 
unconstitutional, even where religious denominations are tangi- 
bly aided, so long as overall religious neutrality is observed. 
For reasons already explained, this writer considers the in- 
tended meaning of the word "religion" in the first amendment to 
be a practical synonym of conscience or recognition of the ulti- 
mate basis of morality. If this theory is right, then religion, in 
the legal sense, is so broad as to be an inevitable permeation 
into virtually all phases of human life and society. One can be a 
militant atheist, or a devout churchman; but, in either case, 
there is a religion in the eyes of the law, for both undeniably 
seek a final measure of right and wrong. Given this premise, it 
follows that religion, whether so designated or not, is a necessary 
unavoidable part of education, as much so as physics or gram- 
mar. Hence, if tax subsidies, credits, deductions, or other direct 
or indirect relief to education were unconstitutional whenever 
religion of one kind or another were promoted, such support of 
all education would be unconstitutional. It is most evident that 
our constitutional guarantees of religious liberty were never in- 
tended to inhibit the activities of civil government in promoting 
education. From this it follows that public support of private ed- 
ucation, whatever its religious content may be, is generally con- 
sistent with our fundamental law. 
Nevertheless, in the interests of fairness to those who think 
otherwise, let it be postulated that the framers of the first 
amendment had a much narrower idea of religion in mind than 
this writer has supposed. Assume, for the sake of discussion, 
that our forefathers considered religion to be a personal relation- 
ship between man and spiritual God, a theological deity as such. 
In that case, an atheist or humanist would have no religion in 
the legal sense. All or most persons who do not believe in a Su- 
preme Being would find no legal protection in the religion 
clauses of the first amendment. It is hard to imagine how this 
could be reconciled with the lofty thinking of James Madison 
and Thomas Jefferson. And, assuming that this narrow idea 
were the intended meaning of the word "religion" in the first 
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amendment, and that the intended meaning must control consti- 
tutional interpretation, some very large changes would have to 
be made in our contemporary jurisprudence. Out would go cases 
such as Tor~aso,?~ Seeger,78 and Welsh.79 
But even assuming all this, what of the problem of public 
support of private education under the intended meaning of the 
establishment clause? It is clear enough that the establishment 
clause originated from the Virginia Statute of Religious Free- 
dom, which merely prohibited tax support of religious worship 
or ministry, and prohibited legal disabilities or penalties im- 
posed on account of individual religious belief or practice. The 
statute did not mention, much less prohibit, public support of 
any kind of education. If it said anything about this subject by 
way of implication, it said that public support of all education 
shall be as equal as possible, regardless of whether the teaching 
reflects one sectarian viewpoint or another. Even given the nar- 
row view of religion here supposed, a denial of public money on 
account of religious content or perspective built into an educa- 
tional curriculum would be a legal discrimination against re- 
ligion, a civil disability, which the Virginia Statute of Religious 
Freedom and the establishment clause of the first amendment 
were designed to forbid. 
In any event, tax support of a church, ministry, or place of 
worship was considered constitutionally different from tax sup- 
port of education. As evidence of this, we may note the satisfac- 
tion of a clergyman in Virginia around 1850, who commented 
that, despite the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, "Relig- 
ion and morals have not suffered. Four colleges, two theological 
seminaries, and the University have been added to the public 
institutions for instru~tion."~~ Indeed, Thomas Jefferson, the au- 
thor of the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, clearly recog- 
nized "moral philosophy" as a normal part of public education 
in Query XV of Notes on Virginia? And in a letter of April 21, 
1803, to Dr. Benjamin Rush, Mr. Jefferson outlined his view that 
the principles of Judeo-Christianity-"religion" properly so- 
called-were an indispensible part of the evolution of moral phi- 
77. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
78. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
79. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
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10sophy.~~ As father of the University of Virginia, Jefferson cer- 
tainly envisioned religion as an important phase of edu~ation.~' 
The Northwest Ordinance," which was reenacted by the 
same Congress that framed the Federal Bill of Rights, contained 
two noteworthy provisions: "No person, demeaning himself in a 
peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on ac- 
count of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments . . . . Re- 
ligion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good govern- 
ment and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of 
education shall forever be enco~raged.'"~ It is impossible to rec- 
oncile this language with an interdiction of direct or indirect tax 
support of education simply because some part thereof is 
religious. 
Finally, let it be observed that the Statutes of 1 James I, 
Chapter 4 (1603) and 3 James I, Chapter 5 (1606) provided that 
if a parent sent his child abroad for education under Roman 
Catholic auspices he would forfeit 100 pounds. Likewise, the 
Statute of 3 Charles I, Chapter 2 (1628) ordained that if a par- 
ent sent his child abroad for education in a Catholic institution 
to strengthen the religious conviction of the youth, he would in- 
cur important substantial disabilities and forfeit all his prop- 
erty? While it is doubtful whether these statutes were ever re- 
ceived in America," the 16th Article of the Virginia Bill of 
82. Id. at 566-70. 
83. See Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination 
of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645. See also Reed, J., dissenting in 
Illinois v. Bd. of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 245-47 (1947). 
84. Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 (1789). 
85. Id. 
86. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 451. 
87. The Virginia Convention of 1776, which enacted the 16th Article of the Virginia 
Bill of Rights, also passed a general provision for the reception of English common law 
which said, 
That the common law of England, all statutes or acts of parliament made in 
aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of king James the 
first, and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, together 
with the several acts of the general assembly of this colony now in force, so far 
as the same may consist with the several ordinances, declarations, and resolu- 
tions of the general convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be con- 
sidered as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative power 
of this colony. 
9 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 126, ch. 5 (W. Hening comp. 1823). I t  is questionable 
whether the English statutes mentioned in the text could be characterized as general 
statutes in aid of the common law. But assuming they were, the reception provision 
above could countenance no more than the statutes of 1 and 3 James I. If received, these 
statutes of James were abolished by the 16th Article of the Virginia Bill of Rights en- 
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Rights and the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, thus also 
the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amend- 
ment, were certainly designed to prohibit features of this kind. 
In other words, our constitutional mandate of religious lib- 
erty prohibits government from imposing financial or other pen- 
alties on parents who have chosen to send their children to 
schools organized or managed by some religious denomination. 
Parents plainly have the fundamental right to choose the reli- 
gious exposure of their children in educati~n:~ without suffering 
government-created discrimination. Granting this, it is surely 
unconstitutional not to accommodate in some degree those par- 
ents who send their children to private schools for the sake of 
religious exposure. 
When government establishes a system of public education, 
expenditures for fixed costs simply must be paid by public reve- 
nues raised from taxable wealth without regard to other consid- 
erations. Otherwise, the undoubtedly legitimate end of govern- 
ment-maintained education would be altogether impossible. 
But government expenditures to pay the variable costs of 
education are another matter. As to these, there is room for flex- 
ibility to account for different kinds of education, including pub- 
lic, private, secular, and sectarian forms. With respect to such 
outlays, the aim of government should be to equalize the benefit 
made available to each student within each category for which 
support is provided, regardless of religious exposure in educa- 
tional experience. While mathematical precision is not achieva- 
ble, this should be required to the extent practically possible, 
because all education is religious, and all religions are properly 
equal before the law. 
Therefore, if a parent sends his child to a private school, the 
child should receive the same practical equality of variable-cost 
benefit from public money as any other child in the community. 
On the other hand, the parent should not be required to pay 
more for that practical equality of variable-cost benefit than his 
tax liability would otherwise indicate. To whatever extent tax 
adjustments or school subsidies may be needed to achieve this 
end, in the admittedly rough terms in which government must 
operate, they ought to be granted. The reason is that, without 
acted by the Virginia Convention of 1776, as enforced by the Virginia General Assembly 
in Chapter 2 of the Acts of October, 1776. 
88. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
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these aids, the parent would suffer a money forfeiture in conse- 
quence of selecting the religious exposure of his child's educa- 
tion, the same sort of thing that the Statutes of 1 and 3 James I 
imposed, and that the first amendment was intended to forbid. 
Our constitutional guarantee against the establishment of 
religion has been warped by a destructive dogmatism built upon 
a mild figure of speech. The establishment clause, in its in- 
tended meaning, prohibits any government-ordained religion, 
but does not require absolute separation of church and state. In 
its primary thrust, the establishment clause was intended to 
guarantee equal protection of all religions peaceably practiced. 
When considered in relation to its origins, the establishment 
clause not only allows public support of private schools, includ- 
ing those which are explicitly and formally religious, but actually 
requires the government to do whatever is reasonably necessary 
to assure that all proper education is treated with practical 
equality. The support of education is certainly a legitimate 
function of government, and all education is religious. Therefore, 
our judiciary should jettison all traces of separationism in pass- 
ing on the constitutionality of statutes supporting private educa- 
tion. Instead, it is time for the courts of this country to consider 
statutes supporting public and private education together, and 
to adopt a new constitutional standard that will assure practical 
equality of variable-cost government support for each child, re- 
gardless of the religious exposure in his educational experience, 
and without imposing unnecessary burdens on parents who have 
made a conscientious choice of nonpublic schooling. This is true 
freedom of religion, and a blessing the first amendment was in- 
tended to secure. 
